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Abstract 
This article reviews three books written by Larry May concerning the foundations of 
international criminal law: Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (2005), War 
Crimes and Just War (2007), and Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (2008). 
Larry May, in this multi-volume series, seeks to elucidate the normative foundations of 
international criminal law.  May treats in separate volumes crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression.  Although May's aim here is not to provide a 
systematic analysis of the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) or its 
mandate (as stated in the 1998 Rome Statute), much of the practical and theoretical 
importance of his project is bound up with the ICC and its future development.  May's 
work, however, does not represent a defense of the ICC or of the Rome Statute.  Indeed, 
much of what is compelling in May's work urges a significant rethinking of the bases of 
international law, and argues for limits upon the conduct of international institutions such 
as the ICC.  In this review, I provide an overview of May's arguments, and present one 
concern regarding the general project upon which May is embarked. 
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Books under review in this essay:
Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account by Larry May. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2005. 328 pp. $30.99, Paperback.
War Crimes and Just War by Larry May. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2007. 357 pp. $29.99, Paperback.
Aggression and Crimes Against Peace by Larry May. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2008. 368 pp. $27.99, Paperback.
Introduction
It should be remarked, first of all, that Larry May’s project in these volumes is very
ambitious.1 The topic of international law is notoriously vexed, and international criminal
law, in particular, carries with it a litany of conceptual puzzles and practical difficulties.
May does not shy away from these problems, and, as a result, his attempt to provide
a normative grounding for international criminal law requires him to engage with an
impressive array of authors and arguments. The scope of May’s work is further broadened
by the capaciousness of his interests and expertise. This is not merely a philosophical
exploration of international law but also a legal and historical study as well. May appears to
be as comfortable discussing international case law (with a focus upon prosecutions carried
out by the tribunals for Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Nuremberg) as he is the history
of political theory (thoughtful explorations of Hobbes, Grotius, Vattel, and others help to
orient many of May’s own arguments). Fortunately, the clarity of May’s writing and his
consistent practice of reminding the reader of the structure of his argument allow him to
synthesize these diverse topics into a coherent form that ought to be accessible to readers of
many backgrounds. Indeed, it is difficult for me to imagine anyone, of any background, who
would not learn a great deal from this impressive body of work. As a result, in May’s avowed
aim, to “spark the interest of both political philosophers and practitioners of international
law” (May 2005, xiii), he should be assured of great success.
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Given the extensive scope of May’s project, it is impossible for me to do justice to the
entire sweep of his arguments here.2 Thus, this study will focus upon one central element
of May’s arguments: the moral foundations of international criminal law. I will focus upon
the relationship between the morality and the legality of the actions that May places under
scrutiny. This will lead me to neglect many interesting legal and political claims, but I
hope that it will permit me to highlight May’s most important arguments. The primary
insight that I draw from May’s impressive study of international criminal law is just how
difficult and multifaceted the moral problems facing international legal theorists really are.
In both the fundamental orientation of international criminal law and in the interpretation
of legal specifics, May reveals a bewildering complexity of moral and legal issues. Given
the difficulty of these issues, and the fact that May himself seems to endorse such different
strategies for reconciling the morality and legality of different aspects of international
criminal law, I will argue that what is currently lacking in discussions of international
criminal law is the need for open and transparent procedures capable of treating these
difficulties. The international community needs to develop permanent, formal mechanisms
allowing individuals of various nationalities to participate in the further development of
international criminal law. In the absence of a standard legislature, it is not sufficient to
rely upon individual judges to resolve difficult questions concerning the alteration and
interpretation of international criminal law. Although the International Criminal Court
(ICC) has provisions for the periodic review and amendment of the Rome Statute,3 more
thought needs to go into how to make international criminal law more accessible and
responsive to the people upon whom it is binding.
In what follows, I will begin by introducing H. L. A. Hart’s challenge to international
law, interpreting it as a demand for international procedural justice. Then I will outline the
central arguments in each of May’s books, focusing upon the moral grounds May proposes
for international criminal law. Next, I will explain the difference between May’s moral and
legal assessment of actions undertaken in the international sphere. Finally, in the conclusion
of this review, I will return to my concern about procedural justice in international criminal
law.
Hart and the Challenge to International Law
One of the central and perennial problems for international law concerns the charge that it
ought not properly be understood as law. This challenge, inspired by H. L. A. Hart’s work in
The Concept of Law, contends that international law, in virtue of its being international (and
thus transcending the formal legal institutions of individual states), fails to possess some of
the basic structural features required of a mature legal system. In particular, Hart contended
that international law is comprised only of primary rules (rules that enjoin or prohibit
behavior) without secondary rules (which enable the recognition, change, and adjudication
of primary rules).4 Most importantly, this objection has been taken (though not necessarily
by Hart) to entail that because there is no consensus amongst legal experts about what is or is
not valid international law, international legal norms ought not be binding upon individuals
and states.5 Historically, the lack of permanent international legal institutions, and the ad
hoc nature of international criminal tribunals, led many to believe that international criminal
law was but a disparate and shifting collage of treaties, informal multinational agreements,
and simple custom. This has inclined many to reject the legitimacy of prosecutions for
international crimes, dismissing them as mere show trials meting out victor’s justice.
The signing of the 1998 Rome Statute by some 139 states indicates the growing
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these states have not yet ratified the treaty—and that the United States and Israel have not
signed the treaty—gives an indication of the dissensus yet remaining). What we seem to
be witnessing is the gradual emergence of rules for identifying valid international criminal
law. In this way, we appear to be making progress towards diffusing one element of Hart’s
challenge: There may be an emerging consensus about how to recognize valid law in
the international legal community. Yet, even if this is the case, and there is indeed an
emerging rule of recognition for international criminal law, I will argue that this does
not fully answer Hart’s challenge. What we still lack in international criminal law are
secondary rules for changing, interpreting, and augmenting such law. Until institutions and
mechanisms enshrining such rules are forthcoming, there will continue to be those who
refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of international criminal law.
Outline of the Arguments
Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (2005)
In the first volume in this series, May attempts to provide a philosophical justification of
international prosecutions for crimes against humanity. It is important to emphasize the
peculiarity of such prosecutions: They are to be trials of individual citizens of sovereign
states, conducted by international tribunals, for crimes committed against groups of people.
Defendants in such cases are not being tried for murder, torture, or rape. Instead, they
are being prosecuted for a set of crimes (including genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other
group-based offenses) that are not normally part of a domestic criminal code. May here sets
himself the task of justifying such prosecutions, against a series of objections that deny the
need, moral appropriateness, or legitimacy of such international legal proceedings.
May’s justificatory strategy is to argue that there are limits to state sovereignty and that,
when those limits are transgressed, the international community has jurisdiction over crimes
committed by individuals within the offending states. More specifically, May proposes two
principles for international criminal law. First, the Security Principle places limits of the
sovereignty of states. This principle holds that if a state either fails to protect, or actively
undermines the physical safety and security of its citizens, it forfeits its prima facie right to
noninterference from the international community. The second principle, the International
Harm Principle, restricts the class of crimes that should fall under the jurisdiction of
international tribunals. May claims that only crimes perpetrated against groups of people
(rather than against particular individuals) ought to be prosecuted as international crimes.
If we focus upon the moral claims advanced here, we notice a particularly fascinating
move made by May: He grounds his analysis of crimes against humanity in an extended
discussion of Hobbes’ moral minimalism (see in particular May 2005: 14–35 and 216–219).
May follows Hobbes in tracing our moral obligations back to our long-run self-interest but
then uses our right to protect ourselves as the justification for an international (rather
than merely domestic) legal regime. Although May refrains from framing his argument in
this way, we can gain some insight into May’s strategy here if we reconstruct his claims
in contractarian terms: Individuals desire protection, and so they collectively contract to
subject themselves to a sovereign in order to gain such protection. In certain cases, however,
the sovereign fails to protect and instead victimizes them. In such cases, individuals are no
longer obligated to obey their sovereign. In addition to this standard Hobbesian story, May
seems to be arguing that individuals in such a situation would consent to the authority of an
international organization that could protect them, were such an organization to exist. Given

































the laws of the international community. So far, this helps to explain May’s Security
Principle. To see how May derives his second principle, we must recognize the possibility
that, just as a sovereign might victimize its subjects, an international organization might
also overstep its authority. This, I take it, is why May limits the jurisdiction of international
criminal law to a subset of crimes that could be perpetrated by sovereign states (to what
he calls group-based crimes). Furthermore, we see here the grounds of what May calls his
defendant-oriented approach to international criminal law. The same Hobbesian suspicion
of authority that undergirds his moral minimalism also motivates him to be wary of the
possibility of overextending international legal structures in a way that victimizes citizens
rather than protecting them.
War Crimes and Just War (2007)
In May’s second volume, he turns his attention to international crimes committed during
the course of armed conflict. May uses traditional just war theory as a backdrop and foil
for a reformulated account of international humanitarian law (as this body of law has
come to be called). War crimes pose a particularly difficult challenge for May due to the
conventional features of many elements of this body of law. Unlike genocide and ethnic
cleansing (whose wrongness is intrinsic to the crimes themselves), many—though certainly
not all—rules of war seem to be grounded in contingent agreements between warring states
(for example, May argues convincingly that there is no principled reason to outlaw chemical
weapons while permitting the use of high-altitude aerial bombardment). The challenge for
May, therefore, is to provide a compelling justification for international prosecutions for
war crimes while at the same time recognizing the historical contingency of many of the
relevant laws.
The cornerstone of May’s argument here is what he calls the principle of humaneness.
This principle is intended to serve as the unifying ground of many of the just war tradition’s
own principles (in particular, May attempts to derive the principles of discrimination,
necessity, and proportionality from his principle of humaneness). The specific content of
the principle of humaneness remains somewhat obscure, but May’s general point is clear:
He thinks that prosecutions for war crimes ought to be justified by recourse to a moral duty
to treat people humanely. What is most interesting in this strategy is that the moral duty to
treat others humanely is not a moral duty that binds all equally. Rather, it is an expansion
of our standard moral duties, which obliges soldiers and military officials specifically.
May claims that soldiers must, lest they be transformed into mere thugs and murderers,
be bound by a code of honor that requires more expansive mercy than is required from
ordinary civilians.
It is this code of honor that May argues ought to serve as the moral ground of trials for
war crimes. Soldiers have a duty to treat others humanely, and states have an obligation to
instill and enforce a military code of honor capable of ensuring such humane treatment. The
duty to treat others humanely requires soldiers to exhibit mercy and compassion even in the
face of great danger to themselves. This generates, among other things, a moral demand
not to target vulnerable individuals, stewardship duties toward prisoners, and an obligation
to minimize suffering. Soldiers, therefore, are to be held morally liable for breaches of
their duty to act humanely in wartime, and leaders are morally responsible for ensuring that
soldiers adhere to this duty.
Despite the very expansive moral requirements set out by May’s principle of humane-
ness, he thinks that it warrants few criminal trials. According to May, the duty to treat
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entails, somewhat surprisingly, that most soldiers who fail to live up to the code of military
honor should be exempted from international criminal prosecution. Instead, May argues
that leaders who order or allow soldiers to act inhumanely ought to be the primary targets
of international criminal tribunals.
Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (2008)
May’s substantive argument in favor of prosecutions for the crime of aggression involves
linking the crime of aggression to violations of fundamental human rights. He argues that if
individuals, by initiating a war, undermine the ability of states to protect the human rights
of citizens, then they have committed a grave moral wrong. May thus greatly complicates
the traditional understanding of aggression that ties it merely to launching a first strike,
or to the violation of the territorial integrity of another state. Despite this endorsement of
international criminal trials for aggression, May spends much of the book arguing against
interpretations of the crime of aggression that would lead to widespread prosecutions
of civilians, military, or government officials. In general, May wishes to reserve such
prosecutions for state leaders who clearly and unambiguously initiate the first wrong.
Unlike crimes against humanity and war crimes, the ICC is currently not authorized
to prosecute individuals for the crime of waging aggressive war. As a result of widespread
disagreement among signatories of the Rome Statute over how to understand aggression, the
ICC has postponed (until 2009) its attempt to define the elements of the crime of aggression.
Perhaps because of the timeliness of his discussion (this volume was published in 2008),
we here see May engage most directly with contemporary legal discussions concerning the
mandate of the ICC. Directly addressing a legal community divided over whether, when,
and how individuals ought to be tried for breaking the peace, May argues forcefully for a
highly restricted approach to prosecutions for crimes against peace.
The Distance between Moral And Legal Norms
In each of the above cases, a striking feature of May’s argument is the distance he leaves
between the appropriate grounds of moral condemnation and criminal prosecution. In
general, May is very willing to blame individuals for their conduct in the international
arena, but highly reluctant to use criminal law as a censure for their behavior. Throughout
this series, he offers a number of reasons for this distance between morality and legality on
the international stage.
First, May sees himself as proposing a defendant-oriented approach to international
criminal law as a kind of corrective to what he sees as the traditional focus upon victims.
May reminds his readers often that, while the crimes prosecuted by international courts
might be some of the most worst unimaginable, the rule of law requires us to design legal
procedures that will take seriously the presumed innocence of defendants. As a result, May
seems willing to leave an enormous distance between actions he deems morally awful and
those he argues ought to be the object of criminal punishment.
Second, May argues that in times of armed conflict, standard excusing conditions
for illegal behavior will be common. May argues that the psychological conditions that
typically obtain during war ought to exclude many people who act immorally from criminal
prosecution before international tribunals. In particular, he claims that the defenses of duress
and superior orders ought to shield most soldiers and civilians from criminal convictions.

































most international crimes. In cases of genocide, war crimes, and aggression, May claims
that it ought to be leaders rather than followers who stand before international tribunals,
largely because of the availability of compelling psychological excuses for those most
directly involved in the atrocities.
Third, and most interestingly, during his discussion of the crime of aggression, May
indicates that a central reason for the distance between his moral condemnations of behavior
and his willingness to support criminal punishment derives from the way he understands
collective action and collective liability.6 Drawing upon his extensive past work on the
subject of collective responsibility,7 May argues that many of the actions under consideration
in international law are best understood as collective actions. Further, May expresses a deep
suspicion of collective liability schemes in criminal law, arguing that “Unlike non-criminal
contexts, where it might make sense to hold people collectively responsible because the
penalties are relatively light, things change dramatically when what is at stake is loss of
freedom and even loss of life in criminal prosecutions” (May 2008: 266).
One of the most important and, in May’s view, troubling legacies of the Nuremberg
trials was the introduction into international criminal law of a theory of criminal conspiracy
borrowed from American jurisprudence. According to this theory, we should be held
individually criminally liable for participating in the actions of a criminal group. May
argues that such a theory is ill suited to international criminal law (May 2008: 186 and 259).
Although May’s claims here are addressed to crimes against peace (and to the relationship
between mens rea and actus reus considerations more specifically), I think this assertion
can be quite productively generalized to the rest of his project. May appears to be arguing
quite broadly against the use of collective liability schemes in international (and perhaps
even domestic) criminal trials.
Because international crimes necessarily involve the actions of large groups or col-
lectives, May is highly reluctant to assign individual criminal responsibility to the actors
comprising those groups. In the case of crimes against humanity, it is not particular offenses
of assault, murder, or rape that are to be prosecuted by international tribunals, but rather
the crimes of genocide or ethnic cleansing. As such, the crimes falling under the purview
of international criminal law involve large numbers of wrongful actions that are related in a
systematic way. Similarly, in the case of war crimes, it is not merely the fact that individual
soldiers committed acts of wrongful violence that merits special prosecutions, but it is the
fact that such acts were conducted in the course of coordinated state military action. It is
this systematic interconnection of wrongful activity that seems to justify the existence of
a separate jurisdiction of international criminal law, but this same interconnection makes
May intensely skeptical of the appropriateness of individual prosecutions. Especially in
the case of aggression, May seems to doubt the possibility of being able to establish the
elements of the crime (that is, the defendant had both a guilty mind and engaged in a guilty
act) while still respecting the rule of law.
In the case of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, then,
May places a heavy burden of justification on international criminal prosecutions. He urges
that it will be quite difficult to successfully try individuals for offenses that they themselves
committed, rather than merely assigning guilt indiscriminately with an overly broad brush.
In each case, this leads May to argue for focusing such trials on state leaders, rather than
on civilians, soldiers, or lower ranking officials. According to May, it is usually only in the
case of state leaders that the actions of an individual and the actions of the collective are
linked in a way sufficient to justify criminal liability.
For these reasons, May endorses only a highly restricted role for international criminal
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normative authority and seems to worry that the ICC will continue to do so in the future.
As a result, May is quite receptive to proposals for condemning collectives, rather than
prosecuting individuals. The primary mechanisms available for such censure, however, are
political, involving such things as economic sanctions and embargoes. Beyond that, May
acknowledges that, in some cases, reconciliation or amnesty programs might be better able
to serve the aims of justice than an international criminal tribunal.
Conclusion
The result of all the above arguments is a rather conservative approach to individual criminal
responsibility and a very limited defense of international criminal prosecutions. Although
May clearly endorses the ICC and actively supports its functions, he is also arguing for
the highly constrained use of the court’s powers. Although May has shown conclusively
that prosecutions for international crimes are fraught with conceptual difficulties, his very
conservative approach to international criminal law will strike many as incompatible with
his strong moral condemnation of the same actions that he wishes to absent from criminal
prosecutions. To give just one example, May seems to morally endorse the idea of contingent
pacifism (claiming that since no successful war can in practice be fought justly, no wars
ought to be fought at all), while arguing that convictions for the crime of aggression ought
to be exceedingly rare. As a result, he seems committed both to the view that all wars are
morally wrong, and to the belief that hardly anyone should be held legally accountable for
starting wars. For many, this will seem to be an untenable balance between moral censure
and legal sanction.
Unfortunately, May’s conservative approach may appear to some to be an attempt to
generate consensus about international criminal law by divorcing it from its appropriate
moral grounds. That is, it might seem that May is recommending a highly constrained
mandate for international criminal law only because that is the most likely way to arrive at
a consensus amongst states about the appropriate role for the ICC or similar institutions.
I don’t believe this is the case; May seems genuinely motivated throughout by a desire
to remain faithful to the demands of the rule of law. However, the intricacy and difficulty
of the arguments presented by May reveal just how many apparently reasonable views
there may be on issues concerning international law. The fact that May himself uses such
divergent strategies to provide a philosophical grounding for international law is also
instructive. Although May claims throughout all three volumes to be presenting a morally
minimalist account of international criminal law, we can identify three different sorts of
moral foundations in his three volumes. In the case of crimes against humanity, May seems
to be grounding international law in moral rights derivable from our basic interests in safety
and security. In the case of war crimes, May attempts to ground international prosecutions
in an expanded set of duties and expectations specific to soldiers and military professionals.
Finally, in the case of aggression, May ties his account of international criminal law to
a conception of human rights, grounding the justification for such prosecutions in the
undermining of a states’ ability to protect human rights. Seen in this way, these are quite
different strategies for grounding international criminal law, drawing upon quite dissimilar
normative foundations. Even if May is correct in carving up the conceptual terrain in this
way, there seems to be sufficient room here for reasonable disagreement over the proper
normative orientation of international criminal law.
If we return to H. L. A. Hart’s initial challenge to international law, we can see just

































course of the last twenty years, the international community has come to an unprecedented
amount of agreement regarding international criminal law. In generating this emerging
consensus regarding the content of international criminal law, however, there is a danger of
stripping such law of any perceived legitimacy. For, although we have seen an increasing
amount of consensus amongst legal experts about what counts as valid international law,
what remains to be seen is progress towards the development of effective mechanisms for
changing, interpreting, and adding to international criminal law. The fundamental challenge
articulated by Hart is not just the lack of a rule for identifying what is valid international
law but the absence of the institutions that normally generate such consensus. It is in large
part the presence of a domestic legislature that provides societies the means to identify, to
alter, and to interpret laws and that generates a mature legal system. International criminal
law has no legislative branch and, as a result, it lacks the legitimacy conferred by such an
institution.8
Although legal experts appear to be approaching consensus on some matters of inter-
national law, and on the Rome Statute in particular, the procedural mechanisms governing
such laws remain distant and obscure. What seems to be lacking from May’s analysis of
international criminal law (and from such discussions generally) is an account of how this
body of law ought to be generated, altered, and interpreted, rather than simply how it ought
to be applied. In the absence of a recognized and accessible legislative body, many who
reject the legitimacy of the court will be unimpressed by the increasing acceptance of a
rule for recognizing what counts as valid law in the international arena. Much of what was
lacking in Hart’s era is still absent today: formal and accessible procedures for generating,
changing, and reinterpreting the contents of international law.
There should be no doubting the importance of Larry May’s valuable contribution to
international legal scholarship. His three volumes (and one can only expect the same from
his fourth) reveal an impressive mastery of a whole array of issues and problems. It is as a
result of his ability to muster such powerful arguments that May’s work is able to reveal the
deficiencies of the institutions of international criminal law: The fact that May is making
such important and sophisticated arguments ought to make us very optimistic about the
prospects for international criminal law; the fact that he is doing so outside of formal legal
institutions ought to cause us concern.
Notes
1. A fourth volume in May’s series, entitled Genocide: A Normative Account, has just been released
by Cambridge University Press.
2. Useful reviews of the individual books have been published by Christopher Gray (2005), Peter
Tramel (2007), and Douglas Lackey (2008).
3. See Article 123 of the Rome Statute (http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/585).
4. See Hart (1961: 208–231).
5. For May’s own analysis of Hart’s challenge, see May (2005: 29–32).
6. Although May discusses issues concerning collective responsibility in each of his works (see
May 2005: 246–253; May 2007: 25–47), it is not until the third volume that we see how deeply
the relationship between collective moral and legal responsibility informs his understanding of
international criminal law (May 2008: 278–289).
7. See especially his The Morality of Groups (1987), Sharing Responsibility (1992), and The Socially
Responsible Self (1996).
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